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C
oncern has been rising about the health of the U.S. commercial 
real estate market and any impact it may have on financial markets 
and institutions. It is too early to judge the full extent of any prob-
lems, but commercial real estate financing has been shaken by the finan-
cial market turmoil associated with recent residential mortgage defaults. 
The spreads of commercial mortgage-backed securities have widened rela-
tive to Treasury securities, and recent reports suggest that prices for many 
commercial properties are declining. In addition to the direct effects on 
construction activity, large commercial real estate losses by financial insti-
tutions might dampen broad-based economic growth by causing banks to 
cut back on commercial, industrial, and household lending.
One way to gain perspective on the current commercial real estate 
market is to look back at historical experience. A natural comparison is 
with the 1980s and early 1990s. In the 1980s, commercial construction 
boomed, resulting in a massive oversupply of commercial space and 
creating serious financial problems for many depository institutions 
and real estate investors. Many analysts believe these problems helped 
cause a broader credit crunch in the early 1990s, which reduced the 
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89availability of funds to small and middle-sized businesses and slowed 
overall economic growth.
  How is the current economic and financial situation in commer-
cial real estate similar to and different from the conditions leading up to 
the real estate bust in the late 1980s and early 1990s?  The first section 
of this article will describe the earlier episode and identify contributing 
economic and financial factors. The second section will consider how 
current commercial real estate fundamentals are similar to and different 
from the earlier episode. The recent commercial construction boom 
was not as large as in the 1980s, suggesting excess supplies of commer-
cial space may not grow as large. The third section will examine the cur-
rent size and distribution of financial risks relative to the earlier episode. 
A major difference from the early 1990s—increased commercial real 
estate securitization  —may expose developers and investors to shocks 
originating outside the commercial real estate sector. A major similarity 
is that commercial banks currently have a large direct exposure to com-
mercial real estate loans.
I.   What happened In the 1980s and early 1990s?
Although commercial real estate has always been cyclical in nature, the 
1980s and early 1990s stand out as a major episode of overbuilding. For 
example, booming construction during the early 1980s eventually caused 
large increases in office vacancy rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The resulting losses on real estate loans in turn caused a surge in failures 
by banks and savings institutions. After a brief overview of the commer-
cial construction sector, this section describes the causes and extent of the 
1980s building boom and discusses the real and financial consequences of 
the subsequent real estate bust for broader economic activity.
Commercial construction 
The commercial construction sector includes a wide range of prop-
erty types. In this article, this sector is defined as office buildings, retail 
structures, warehouses, and privately owned healthcare facilities. By this 
definition, investment in commercial structures accounted for about 16 
percent of all private investment in structures in 2007 (Chart 1). Con-
struction of multifamily housing (apartments and some townhouses) 
will also be examined in comparing the 1980s and early 1990s with 
the present because the financing of multifamily structures is similar to 





























commercial real estate financing. Investment in multifamily residential 
structures was about 4 percent of private structures investment in 2007. 
Because of their similarities, this article will sometimes examine the 
combined behavior of the commercial and multifamily categories.1
Commercial real estate has historically been subject to booms and 
busts. Booms and busts in commercial and multifamily building may 
partly reflect aggregate fluctuations in output, employment, and finan-
cial market conditions. But some factors that encourage overbuilding 
also may be more specific to the real estate sector. For example, because 
it may take several years from the start to the finish of a commercial de-
velopment project, economic conditions may be quite different when 
a project is completed than when it was first undertaken (Browne and 
Case). The long time lags and large sums the developers spend to plan 
a project may create a bias to go forward with a project even if there is 
evidence that market conditions are weakening. Moreover, real estate 
lenders may sometimes be guilty of assessing the creditworthiness of 
a proposed development on the basis of current or recent past perfor-
mance of the commercial real estate sector rather than a realistic projec-
tion of future prospects. Large fluctuations in commercial construction 
are, therefore, not surprising from a historical perspective.
chart 1
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overbuilding in the 1980s
The overbuilding of commercial and multifamily real estate in the 
1980s is notable even for this highly cyclical industry. Commercial con-
struction activity increased substantially in the first half of the 1980s, 
more than doubling from 1979 to 1985 (Table 1). Although some of 
this growth can be attributed to an increase in the overall price level and 
growth of the real economy, commercial construction climbed sharply 
as a share of GDp from 1979 to 1985. Supporting the strong construc-
tion in the early 1980s, office vacancy rates were low, although vacancy 
rates rose substantially by the second half of the 1980s. Multifamily 
construction also boomed in the first half of the 1980s, with building 
permits rising nearly 50 percent from 1979 to 1985.
 Commercial construction boomed in the 1980s due to many fac-
tors. For example, the demand for office space expanded due to eco-
nomic, structural, and demographic changes. At the same time, federal 
tax laws gave commercial real estate developers greater profits, while 
lending institutions, including savings and loans, were making large 
fees for financing the projects.
Economic  and  demographic  factors  increased  the  demand  for 
commercial space and multifamily housing in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. For example, employment grew strongly in this period as the 
baby-boom generation continued to enter the work force and the labor 
force participation rate of women rose. The mix of jobs shifted more to-
ward service production and away from goods production. As a result, 
growth in the number of people working in offices exceeded 4 percent 
annually in the late 1970s and remained rapid through most of the 
1980s (FDIC). Strong growth in the demand for office space was thus 
a key factor behind the commercial construction boom. But by the late 
1980s, with office vacancy rates rising, growth in the supply of office 
space surpassed growth in demand.
Although all major geographic areas of the country participated 
to some degree in the construction boom, regional differences in the 
size and timing of the boom were notable. Economic conditions in the 
late 1970s were particularly strong in energy-producing regions, such 
as Texas and Oklahoma. A boom in energy-related construction in the 
early 1980s eventually led to sharp increases in office vacancy rates in 
such energy centers as Houston and Oklahoma City, a little ahead of Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  93
the rest of the country. The construction boom came somewhat later 
in new England and other northeastern states, driven partly by the 
expansion of the computer industry in the Boston area and strong fi-
nancial sector and defense-related hiring throughout the northeast. 
California also experienced a major construction boom through much 
of the 1980s, reflecting rapid population growth, a surge of defense-
related manufacturing during the first half of the 1980s, and expanding 
international trade with pacific Rim nations.
Besides strong economic growth, major changes in federal tax laws 
contributed to the commercial construction boom in the first half of 
the 1980s. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) lowered 
personal income and capital gains tax rates. Another provision of ERTA 
was an accelerated cost recovery system that greatly shortened the pe-
riod over which commercial real estate could be depreciated. Faster   
Table 1











(current dollars) (percent of nominal GDp) (percent) (thousands)
1979 33.5 1.3 5.2 444.8
1980 41.0 1.5 3.4 365.7
1981 48.3 1.5 3.8 319.4
1982 55.8 1.7 5.5 365.8
1983 55.8 1.6 10.8 570.1
1984 70.6 1.8 13.1 616.8
1985 84.1 2.0 15.4 656.6
1986 80.9 1.8 16.5 583.5
1987 80.8 1.7 16.3 421.1
1988 86.3 1.7 16.3 386.1
1989 88.3 1.6 16.1 339.8
1990 87.5 1.5 16.7 262.6
1991 68.9 1.1 17.4 152.1
1992 64.5 1.0 18.8 138.4
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; Coldwell Banker vacancy rates from
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depreciation produced higher after-tax returns on commercial real es-
tate projects, encouraging real estate development through tax-oriented 
limited partnerships.
Fiscal policymakers eventually concluded that ERTA provided too 
much of an incentive to invest in real estate development projects. The 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) curtailed tax-oriented real estate part-
nerships by making it impossible for taxpayers to offset ordinary income 
with tax losses generated by “passive” investments, such as commercial 
real estate. In addition, TRA eliminated the accelerated cost recovery 
system, thus lengthening the period over which commercial structures 
were depreciated and reducing their after-tax returns. As a result, inves-
tors became less willing to purchase existing commercial properties in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, contributing to the softening in real 
estate prices (FDIC).
Several factors besides tax-oriented limited partnerships also in-
creased the flow of capital into commercial real estate in the 1980s. 
Real estate lending by commercial banks grew strongly during this pe-
riod because it was expected to be profitable. Of particular importance 
was that such lending generated large up-front fees. In addition, many 
banks expanded their real estate lending because they were experiencing 
greater competition in some of their traditional business lines. For ex-
ample, large corporate borrowers were increasingly turning from bank 
loans to commercial paper for financing. And liberalization of the rules 
governing lending and deposit taking by savings and loan institutions 
also increased the competition facing commercial banks.
Savings institutions, such as savings and loans and mutual savings 
banks, also played an important role in the real estate boom and bust 
of the 1980s and early 1990s. Savings institutions were weakened when 
deposit deregulation caused a large increase in their cost of funds at a 
time when revenues were derived primarily from holdings of low-yield-
ing fixed-rate mortgages. In an attempt to stem the mounting losses, 
savings institutions were allowed to expand into other activities, such as 
commercial real estate lending. Some savings and loans used brokered 
deposits and other funds to rapidly increase their holdings of residential 
and commercial mortgages.2
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Commercial and multifamily construction slowed sharply in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s in response to high office vacancy rates in 
the last half of the 1980s and tax law changes that reduced the after-tax 
return to real estate projects. Commercial construction as a share of 
GDp began to erode in the second half of the 1980s and, by 1992, was 
well below its share of GDp in the early 1980s (Table 1). But the reduc-
tion in construction was too late to stem the rising vacancies. By 1992, 
the national vacancy rate had climbed to nearly 19 percent. Multifam-
ily construction also weakened sharply, with building permits plunging 
between 1985 and 1992. With such an excess of commercial and mul-
tifamily space, rents and property prices deteriorated, and many real 
estate developers and lenders experienced large losses.
The decline in commercial real estate construction helped cause the 
recession in the early 1990s. Economic activity peaked in July 1990 ac-
cording to the national Bureau for Economic Research, and the economy 
contracted through March 1991. Although this contraction was shorter 
than average, real GDp and employment recovered more sluggishly than 
in a typical postwar business cycle (Schreft and Singh). Federal Reserve 
Chairman Greenspan attributed the sluggishness of the recovery to fi-
nancial “headwinds” generated by the “constriction of credit in response 
to major losses at banks, associated with real-estate and foreign lending, 
coupled with a crisis in the savings and loan industry.”
Commercial and multifamily overbuilding in the 1980s and the 
resulting losses by real estate lenders contributed to a sharp increase in 
failures of financial institutions. These conditions in turn likely reduced 
the availability of credit to small and medium-sized businesses that were 
otherwise uninvolved in the real estate problems. Failures at savings 
institutions and commercial banks increased (Chart 2). Total closings 
and assistance transactions surged from 10 institutions in 1979 to 534 
in 1989. Failures of savings institutions and commercial banks tapered 
off in the early 1990s and remained extremely low through 2007.
Although other credit problems contributed to the elevated failure 
rate, bank failures were closely associated with high concentrations of 
real estate lending.3  Compared with surviving banks, banks that failed 
in the 1980s had higher ratios of commercial real estate loans to total 
assets, commercial real estate loans to total real estate loans, noncurrent 96  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
commercial real estate loans to total commercial real estate loans, and 
real estate charge-offs to total charge-offs (FDIC).
Some economists have argued that large real estate losses at com-
mercial banks—particularly in new England and other northeastern 
states—created a “credit crunch” in the early 1990s. Banks experiencing 
large losses on commercial real estate loans may have had to restore their 
capital-to-asset ratios quickly, perhaps in part because bank regulators 
increased their scrutiny (peek and Rosengren 1992). Due to reduced 
earnings and an unfavorable financial environment, it may have been 
difficult for such institutions to raise new capital quickly, causing them 
instead to call existing loans or to refuse to extend new credit so as to 
shrink their assets to a level consistent with their capital base. Such as-
set shrinkage may have severely harmed small and medium-sized busi-
nesses that were more dependent on bank financing. Such businesses 
may have been too small to access capital markets directly or borrow 
from financial institutions outside their region.
chart 2
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Economists have disagreed on the extent to which the credit crunch 
caused, or increased the severity of, the 1990-91 recession. Some re-
searchers conclude there probably was a bank credit crunch, but it is 
doubtful that a credit crunch played a major role in worsening the 
1990s recession (Bernanke and Lown). Other researchers argue that 
shortfalls in bank capital reduced the availability of bank credit to small 
and medium-sized businesses, thereby slowing overall economic growth 
(Hancock and Wilcox; peek and Rosengren 1995).
II.   have  recent  commercIal  real  estate  Fun-
damentals Been sImIlar or dIFFerent?
Whether or not a credit crunch in the early 1990s had a major ef-
fect on the business cycle, the construction boom created a huge over-
supply of commercial space in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is diffi-
cult to predict whether this situation will be repeated currently because 
the future supply of and demand for commercial space are uncertain. 
However, important differences between the two episodes suggest that 
the commercial and multifamily markets may not face excess supplies 
as large as in the early 1990s.
Growth in supply and demand for space
A quick look at growth in the supply of and demand for commer-
cial space suggests that, to the extent that there is any current overbuild-
ing, it is not as great as in the 1980s. On the supply side, commercial 
and multifamily construction has not boomed to the same degree as in 
the 1980s. Looking at commercial and multifamily construction as a 
share of GDp helps control for overall growth of the economy and the 
price level over time (Chart 3). Although commercial and multifamily 
construction strengthened in the last couple of years, their combined 
output share in 2007 was substantially below their peak in the 1980s. In 
1985, commercial and multifamily construction accounted for about 3 
percent of nominal GDp. This combined share dropped to 1 percent in 
1992 and then gradually drifted up over the rest of the 1990s, only to 
weaken in the 2001 recession. Commercial and multifamily construc-
tion increased to about 1.5 percent of nominal GDp in 2007, still more 
than a percentage point below their combined share in 1985.98  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
Although the smaller share of commercial construction reduces 
concerns about the potential for overbuilding, growth in the demand 
for commercial and multifamily space also may be weaker than in the 
1980s. For example, employment growth in the main tenants of com-
mercial office space—financial activities and professional and business 
services—slowed to about 1.5 percent annually in 2000-07, after grow-
ing at over a 3 percent average annual rate in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Growth of office employment is unlikely to recover to the strong pace 
in the 1980s and 1990s but should remain stronger than overall em-
ployment growth over the next decade (Chart 4). Office employment is 
unlikely to grow as fast as in the 1980s and 1990s because demographic 
factors, such as population aging, will reduce overall growth of the la-
bor force (Clark and nakata).
Even if office employment growth is likely to slow from its previ-
ous pace, it is still likely to remain above total employment growth over 
the next decade (Figueroa and Woods). Financial activities employment 
chart 3
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is projected to increase 1.5 percent annually from 2006 to 2016, and 
professional and business services employment is projected to rise 2 
percent annually—both above the expected growth rate of 1 percent 
annually in total employment. partly due to population aging, health-
care employment is projected to grow more than 2 percent annually, 
which also should raise the demand for nonresidential space.
Demand for multifamily housing could also be solid enough to 
prevent a serious excess supply of apartments. Apartment demand de-
pends on growth in the number of households and the decisions of 
households about whether to own or rent a housing unit. The number 
of households is expected grow somewhat more slowly from 2006 to 
2016. But a prolonged reduction in the availability of mortgage financ-
ing—especially to households with poor credit histories—and the rise 
in home foreclosures may cause a movement from homeownership to-
ward rental housing. After a sharp increase in homeownership from 
1995 to 2005, homeownership has recently been declining, and some 
Chart 4
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forecasters project that more than 2 million Americans will switch from 
owning to renting by 2010 (nechayev).
how have vacancy rates and prices behaved?
Because of the moderate construction share and the solid trends 
in demand, commercial and multifamily real estate markets are not 
currently overbuilt to the same degree as in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
However, demand projections covering the next year or two are espe-
cially uncertain in light of the employment declines and continued 
financial market turmoil in the first half of 2008. vacancy rates and 
changes in property prices offer some additional information on the 
balance between commercial real estate supply and demand. To this 
point, national vacancy rates and commercial property prices are be-
having differently than in the late 1980s to early 1990s.
national office vacancy rates are lower than in the years before the 
1990-91 recession. Office vacancy rates rose during and immediately 
after the 2001 recession but have drifted downward since 2003 (Chart 
5). The national office vacancy rate has risen slightly but was about 13 
percent in the first quarter of 2008, compared with 18 percent in 1989. 
According to one analysis, to push vacancy rates back to their 1990 
levels would require a “catastrophic scenario” in which “massive layoffs” 
lead to unprecedented drops in demand (Chen and Southard). vacancy 
rates for warehouses and other light industrial structures are about the 
same as in 1989, but this sector was not overbuilt in the 1980s to the 
same degree as office buildings, and industrial vacancy rates rose fairly 
moderately in the 1990-91 recession.4
The prices of commercial property appear to be weakening after 
a period of sharp appreciation in the last few years. The transactions-
based commercial property price index from the MIT Center for Real 
Estate shows sales prices for a mix of institutional-grade office, apart-
ment, retail, and industrial properties (Chart 6).5  In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, commercial property prices often declined, and the 
declines  were  particularly  severe  during  and  immediately  after  the 
1990-91 recession. The recent pattern of price change is quite differ-
ent, with extremely rapid appreciation from 2005 through the first half 
of 2007 but a rapid deceleration of prices in the second half of 2007. 
This index declined in the third and fourth quarters of 2007, but rose 
slightly in the first quarter of 2008.6Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  101
Although the sharp deceleration of commercial real estate prices 
last year likely reflected reduced expectations of the demand for space, 
credit market conditions may have independently influenced the vol-
ume and price of real estate transactions. After ample availability of 
credit for commercial real estate transactions from 2005 through the 
first half of 2007, financial market turmoil reduced credit to commer-
cial and multifamily real estate developers in the second half of 2007 
and the first half of 2008.
III.  has recent commercIal real estate FInanc-
Ing Been sImIlar or dIFFerent?
This section identifies some similarities and differences in the fi-
nancing of commercial real estate between the late 1980s to early 1990s 
and the present. First, the section documents an important difference:   
the substantial growth in securitization of commercial and multifam-
ily mortgages since 1990. Second, it examines whether the amount of 
commercial and multifamily mortgages has changed relative to GDp 
and whether the holders of these mortgages are similar or different. 
Third, it considers whether commercial banks have similar exposures to 
commercial real estate risks as in the late 1980s to early 1990s.
chart 5
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securitization growth
A major difference between the earlier real estate cycle and the 
present is the degree of real estate securitization. Securitization is the 
process by which individual loans, such as the mortgages on particu-
lar commercial properties, are pooled and repackaged into securities 
that can be sold in public capital markets. Interest and principal pay-
ments on the underlying loans are passed through to the holders of the 
publicly traded securities. Often these payments are prioritized so that 
different classes of investors are paid off before others. Securitization 
broadens the sources of capital available to the commercial real estate 
industry and provides investors with a convenient way to invest in a 
diversified pool of commercial and multifamily properties.
Securitization of commercial and multifamily real estate has in-
creased substantially since 1990. Less than 2 percent of commercial 
mortgages were securitized in 1990, but that percentage grew steadily 
to over 26 percent at the end of 2007 (Chart 7). Securitization of 
Chart 6
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multifamily mortgages grew from 11 percent in 1990 to more than 31 
percent at the end of 2007.
The pullback by more traditional commercial and multifamily real 
estate lenders in the late 1980s and early 1990s stimulated the growth 
of real estate securitization (box). Although real estate investment trusts 
already existed, their number and assets grew substantially in the 1990s. 
Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBSs) also expanded in 
importance, and more complex financial instruments, such as commer-
cial real estate collateralized debt obligations (CRE CDOs), emerged 
in the 2000s.
Efforts to resolve the financial failures of the late 1980s and early 
1990s also helped the growth of the CMBS market. Congress created 
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in 1989 to oversee the dispos-
al of assets from failed savings and loan institutions.7  The RTC pooled 
many commercial real estate loans from failed financial institutions into 
CMBS, issuing about $15 billion of such securities between 1991 and 























Source: Flow of Funds Data as reported in CMSA Compendium of statistics.104  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE SECURITIES
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) were created in 1960 by Congress 
as an investment vehicle for holding real properties, mortgage-related assets 
or both. Corporate-level taxes are waived if REITs are widely held and dis-
tribute 90 percent of their taxable income as dividends to shareholders. RE-
ITs can be classified in three broad types:  equity, mortgage, or hybrid. The 
percentages of equity and mortgage REITs have shifted over time, but equity 
REITs continue to dominate.
REITs have three main benefits (krainer). First, they are exchange trad-
ed and thus provide investors with greater liquidity. Also REIT returns are 
not highly correlated with stock market returns and thus give potential for 
investors to diversify. Second, REITs allow capital markets to send valuable 
signals to management about whether they approve of the REITs projects. 
Third, improved integration between real estate markets and capital markets 
reduces the importance of bank finance and may partially insulate end users 
of capital from bank shocks. At the same time, capital market integration 
opens real estate markets to a wider range of financial shocks.
Commercial  mortgage-backed  securities  (CMBSs)  are  backed  by  a 
static pool of commercial mortgages, most of which are investment-grade 
“A-notes.”  A-notes have a senior claim on the income generated by the prop-
erty. The CMBS is structured into a number of rated tranches, and principal 
and interest payments on the underlying commercial real estate loans are 
used to pay the principal and interest on the different tranches by order of 
seniority. Any losses on the underlying loan pool are absorbed in order by 
the most junior tranches. Although the tranches can be structured in various 
ways, typically the security has been designed so that a large part of the debt 
structure gets a high credit rating.
Different types of investors tend to be drawn to different CMBS tranch-
es. The investment-grade tranches are often purchased by financial institu-
tions, insurance companies, and pension funds. The riskier tranches are often 
purchased by specialists in real estate, hedge funds, or CRE CDOs, who 
should have the expertise to accurately assess these higher risks.
Commercial real estate collateralized debt obligations (CRE CDOs) 
emerged in the late 1990s and are still often viewed as a niche product in the 
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to invest in a portfolio of financial assets. For a CRE CDO, these assets can 
include a wide range of commercial real estate securities, such as commer-
cial real estate loans, commercial mortgages, unsecured REIT debt, CMBSs, 
and even other CDOs. Like a CMBS, there is typically a tranched liability 
structure with subordination and additional credit protections. CMBS have 
historically dominated CRE CDO portfolios, but allocations to other types 
of commercial real estate securities have grown rapidly. The CRE CDO mar-
ket mushroomed from $21 billion in 2005 to $36 billion in 2006, driven by 
both issuer and investor demand (Lucas, Goodman, Fabozzi and Manning). 
Issuance of CRE CDOs slowed sharply in the second half of 2007, and these 
securities were not issued in the last two months of 2007 or early 2008.
More recently, monthly issuance of CMBS in the United States 
picked up substantially from 2005 through the first half of 2007. How-
ever, the financial turmoil in the second half of 2007 and the first half of 
2008 has greatly reduced CMBS issuance (Chart 8). In the first quarter 
of 2008, CMBS issuance nearly came to a standstill, with only $6 bil-
lion of securities issued, compared to $61 billion in the first quarter of 
2007, and CMBS issuance remained at this reduced pace in the second 
quarter of 2008.
Although some observers have argued that greater securitization 
could moderate commercial real estate cycles, recent events seem to 
confirm that securitization can also be a source of new disturbances. 
Securitization can stabilize real estate markets by evening out the flow 
of capital to the commercial real estate sector, providing more effective 
market discipline of developers and spreading commercial property risk 
to a broader array of investors. But securitization also can subject the 
commercial real estate market to financial shocks that had relatively 
little effect on commercial property in the past. For example, such mar-
ket disruptions as the Russian bond default and the implosion of Long 
Term Capital Management in 1998 increased CMBS spreads sharply 
and caused liquidity to dry up almost overnight (zhu). The market 
response to these earlier shocks foreshadowed the near shut-down of the 
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Commercial and multifamily mortgage trends
Clearly, greater securitization is an important difference between 
the current real estate situation and the early 1990s. But how different 
is the total value of commercial and multifamily mortgages relative to 
the overall size of the economy, and have holdings of these mortgages 
by different investor groups changed significantly?  A worrisome trend 
is that commercial and multifamily developers currently are relying 
more on debt to finance their projects than in the late 1980s. Com-
mercial and multifamily mortgages were 24 percent of nominal output 
in 2007, up nearly 4 percentage points from 1988 (Chart 9). However, 
relative to the overall size of the economy, commercial and multifamily 
mortgages have climbed much less steeply than residential mortgages 
over this period.
Some important changes have occurred since 1990 with respect to 
which investors hold commercial and multifamily mortgages. Com-
mercial banks held 42 percent of commercial and multifamily mortgag-
es in 2007, up from 36 percent in 1990 (Chart 10). The most dramatic 
change was, however, in the share of CMBS issuers, which rose from 
chart 8
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4 percent in 1990 to 28 percent in 2007. This growth in holdings by 
CMBS issuers is consistent with the large increase in real estate securiti-
zation noted earlier. Life insurance companies, savings institutions, and 
other investors correspondingly decreased their shares of multifamily 
and commercial mortgage holdings, while the government-sponsored 
enterprises slightly raised their share. The decreased shares of life in-
surance companies, savings institutions, and other investors, however, 
may have been offset to some degree by increased holdings of CMBS 
or CRE CDOs.
Although commercial and multifamily mortgages have not changed 
greatly relative to GDp between 1990 and 2007, these trends suggest 
that some concern is warranted on the part of lenders and policymak-
ers. A comparison of commercial and multifamily mortgage holdings 
cannot establish the underlying risks because it cannot control for eco-
nomic and financial conditions or differences in lending standards. But 
the relatively high levels of commercial and multifamily real estate debt 
suggest that financial risks are elevated, and the larger share of mort-
gages held by CMBS issuers suggests the commercial real estate market 
Chart 9
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may be more affected than in the past by financial market disturbances 
originating in other capital markets. 
how exposed are banks?
As the preceding discussion suggests, the exposure of commercial 
banks and savings institutions to commercial and multifamily real es-
tate loans is somewhat higher than in the 1980s. Examining the trends 
in nonresidential real estate loans, multifamily residential loans, and 
construction and land development loans as percentages of the total as-
sets of commercial banks and savings institutions helps shed additional 
light on banks’ exposure.8  nonresidential real estate loans were a little 
over 7 percent of total assets in 2007, slightly above their share in 1990 
(Chart 11). Multifamily residential loans have decreased gradually as a 
share of total assets since 1985 and were less than 2 percent of commer-
cial bank and savings institution assets in 2007. In contrast, construc-
tion and land development loans increased sharply since the mid-1990s, 
approaching 5 percent of assets in 2007, about the same as their peak 
chart 10
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share in the second half of the 1980s. However, because this category 
includes both residential and nonresidential construction loans, much 
of this exposure likely reflects the past boom in single-family home 
construction rather than commercial real estate development.
In December 2006, federal banking regulators issued new guid-
ance on risk management in response to increases in commercial real 
estate  loan  concentrations. The  trend  toward  increased  commercial 
real estate concentration was centered in small to mid-sized banks with 
limited access to the CMBS market (nichols). Most banks with high 
concentrations of commercial real estate loans managed their exposures 
prudently, although some of this success may have been due to the rela-
tively benign economic conditions through 2006 (Lopez). 
Regulators  have  continued  more  recently  to  express  concerns 
about commercial real estate loan concentrations at commercial banks. 
Comptroller Dugan noted that the ratio of commercial real estate loans 
to capital has nearly doubled in the past six years. In addition, over 
a third of the nation’s community banks have commercial real estate 
concentrations exceeding 300 percent of their capital, and nearly 30 
chart 11
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percent have construction and development loans exceeding 100 per-
cent of their capital.
Even excluding construction and development loans, concentra-
tions of nonfarm nonresidential real estate loans are highest among 
small and medium-sized banks (Chart 12). nonresidential real estate 
loans were 20 percent of assets at the end of 2007 for small banks (as-
sets of $100 million to $1 billion) and about 18 percent of assets at 
medium-sized banks (assets of $1 billion to $10 billion). Concentra-
tions of nonfarm nonresidential real estate loans increased fairly steadily 
for both groups of banks since 1998. In contrast, nonresidential real 
estate concentration held fairly steady around 5 percent of assets for 
large banks (assets greater than $10 billion). 
Although the current high exposure to commercial real estate loans 
is similar to that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, real estate lenders 
may have maintained higher lending standards than earlier. However, 
prior to the recent substantial tightening of lending standards, com-
mercial real estate lending standards likely slipped to some degree. For 
example, the Board of Governors’ Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
chart 12
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for January 2007 found that in the prior year, 55 percent of responding 
domestic banks had trimmed the spreads of their commercial real es-
tate loans rates over their cost of funds. Moreover, institutions that had 
eased terms on their commercial real estate loans cited “more-aggressive 
competition from other banks or nonbank lenders as the most impor-
tant reason for having done so.” An important source of competition 
for banks may have been rapid growth in commercial mortgage securi-
tization. various reports suggest that strong CMBS issuance from 2005 
through the first half of 2007 may have been accompanied by easier 
lending terms, similar to developments in residential mortgage lending 
around the same time.9
Iv.   conclusIon
policymakers and analysts can gain some perspective on potential 
commercial real estate problems by examining the similarities and dif-
ferences between the current situation and the real estate boom and 
bust of the 1980s and early 1990s. An important difference is that com-
mercial real estate on its own is less worrisome today than in the late 
1980s and early 1990s because commercial and multifamily construc-
tion is a smaller share of economic activity and office vacancy rates are 
lower. But the economy is still vulnerable to any weakening in this 
sector in the sense that it would add to a list of problems that already 
includes the sharp drop in residential construction and home prices, 
financial market disruptions, and high energy prices.
On the financial side, both the differences and the similarities are 
more worrisome. Although the recent growth of commercial real estate 
securitization is an important difference that may have beneficial long-
run effects by broadening the possible sources of capital and improving 
market discipline, increased securitization also exposes commercial and 
multifamily markets to shocks in other capital markets, such as the recent 
problems in residential mortgage markets. In addition, an important 
similarity is the large exposure of banks to commercial real estate lending. 
In the early 1990s, commercial real estate losses impaired bank capital 
and reduced the availability of credit to small and middle-sized busi-
nesses. An important lesson from that period is that in times of financial 
turmoil, it is important to restore more normal functioning to capital 
markets and to deal promptly with problem financial institutions.112  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
EnDnOTES
1Commercial real estate does not include factories, power and telecommuni-
cations structures, and other heavy industrial structures, which tend to be owned 
by corporations and financed differently than commercial structures. Such heavy 
industrial structures are included along with commercial construction in the non-
residential structures category of the national income and product accounts. Reli-
gious and educational structures, lodging, and amusement and recreation facilities 
are classified as other residential structures rather than commercial construction 
in the national income accounts. Multifamily residential construction is part of 
residential investment in the national income and product accounts, along with 
construction of new single-family housing and other residential structures invest-
ment. Other residential structures investment consists primarily of manufactured 
homes, home improvements, dormitories, and brokers’ commissions on the sale 
of residential structures. 
2Brokered deposits were placed by money brokers, such as securities firms, 
for their customers at the highest available rate. Large sums were often broken 
into deposits of $100,000 or less, which were fully covered by federal deposit 
insurance. As a result, the depositors had an incentive to shop for the highest rate 
with little regard to the credit risks being taken by the depository institution.
3Another credit problem that contributed to high bank failures was energy 
lending. High oil prices in the late 1970s caused a sharp expansion of domes-
tic energy exploration and drilling, leading to riskier investment and bidding up 
prices of oil and gas leases. A drop in energy prices then led to a substantial con-
traction in such activity and large losses for energy-related lenders.
4The Torto Wheaton industrial vacancy rate was 9.4 percent in 2007, slightly 
above its value of 8.9 percent in 1989. This vacancy rate rose to 10.9 percent in 
1991. The industrial vacancy rate rose more sharply during the last recession, 
increasing from 6.8 percent in 2000 to 11.8 percent in 2003. Because the Torto 
Wheaton multifamily vacancy rate is only available back to 1994, it is not pos-
sible to compare the current value of this vacancy rate with its values in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. However, the multifamily vacancy rate of 4.7 percent in 2007 
was slightly below the average of 5.1 percent for 1994-2007. Similarly, the re-
tail vacancy rate was 9.2 percent in 2007, near its average of 9.0 percent for 
1991-2007. 
5This index is produced on a quarterly basis from transactions of commercial 
properties in the national Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries data-
base. An advantage of the index is that it is based on actual sales prices rather than 
the appraisal-based values sometimes used in commercial real estate indexes. The 
index is not, however, a repeat-sales index. The MIT index uses hedonic meth-
ods to control for changes in the mix of properties sold, and for that reason, the 
index may be preferable to average or median sales prices, which may fluctuate Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  113
because of changes over time in the mix of properties. Rappaport provides further 
discussion of repeat-sales and hedonic methods in the context of aggregate house 
prices.  
6The transactions-based price index for all properties was down 1.3 percent 
from the first quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2008. Other data confirm 
the recent softening in commercial real estate prices, although typically such price 
data do not have a long enough history to allow a comparison with the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. For example, the Moody’s/REAL commercial property price in-
dex was down 2.8 percent over the year ending in April 2008.
7The RTC closed its operations in December 1995. By that time, it had man-
aged some 747 closures of savings and loan institutions with total assets of $394 
billion (Curry and Shibut)
8Construction and land development loans are often viewed as being par-
ticularly risky because such projects do not generate revenue until construction 
is completed and the property is sold or rented. Such loans tend to be short-term 
and require refinancing when the project is completed, which may be difficult in 
periods of reduced overall credit availability.
9For example, a report by a major real estate securities rating firm, Fitch Rat-
ings (Johnson and Macneill) stated, “Fitch expects CMBS loan defaults to rise, as 
deals issued in 2005, 2006, and 2007 contain higher concentrations of interest-
only loans, loans with high loan-to-value ratios, and an increasing amount of 
the pool having or allowing for additional subordinate debt. These loans will be 
especially sensitive to any future market downturn.”114  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
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